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This paper explores in a general equilibrium framework the welfare and sectoral implications of an 
optimally designed system of border tax adjustments (BTA) on the imports of energy-intensive industries. 
Recently, several propositions have been made by policy makers and researchers to use BTA as a 
restrictive trade policy instrument to address the loss of competitiveness induced by unilateral stringent 
domestic pollution control policies. In this paper, we define the loss of competitiveness not as a loss of 
output by domestic energy-intensive producers, but instead as a loss of their market shares. We argue and 
we show using the Canadian economy as illustration that the most often proposed BTA, which is based on 
the carbon embodiment of the import good, may under- or over-achieve the objective of addressing the 
competitive disadvantage of domestic energy-intensive industries. In some cases, the proposed BTA may 
over protect the domestic energy-intensive industries by providing implicit subsidies as they might even 
increase their production in the presence of carbon taxes. Similarly, the proposed BTA may fail to fully 
restore the competitiveness of domestic producers, vis-à-vis their foreign peers. We determine the optimal 
BTAs on imports that fully restore the competitiveness of domestic firms following unilateral stringent 
pollution control policies. The ‘optimal’ BTAs take into consideration the general equilibrium effects of 
the carbon tax and of the import charges on the prices of domestic goods. In most cases, the impact their 
impact on import prices is higher than in the previous case. As a consequence, they entail higher 
distortions on resource allocation in the economy and hence higher welfare cost to households. 
 
Key words: Border tax adjustment, competitiveness, energy-intensive industries, general 
equilibrium, Canada. 
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Résumé 
Cette étude examine dans un cadre d'équilibre général les impacts sectoriels et l’impact sur le bien-être 
d'une structure optimale  des ajustements des droits de douanes (ADD) sur les importations des produits 
à forte intensité énergétique. Plusieurs propositions ont été récemment faites dans les milieux 
académiques et gouvernementaux sur l’utilisation des ADD comme instrument de politique commerciale 
afin de réduire la perte de compétitivité liée à l’adoption unilatérale de politiques sévères de contrôle de 
la pollution. Dans cette étude, nous définissons la perte de compétitivité non pas comme une perte de 
production des industries à forte intensité énergétiques, mais plutôt comme une perte de leurs parts de 
marché domestiques. Nous montrons, en nous servant de l'économie canadienne comme illustration, que 
l’ADD le plus souvent proposé, qui est basé sur le contenu en carbone du produit importé, peut dépasser 
ou peut ne pas atteindre l'objectif de réduction de la perte de compétitivité. Nous montrons que dans 
certains cas, l’ADD proposé peut même offrir une sur-protection aux industries nationales à forte 
intensité énergétique en accordant des subventions implicites à la production. Nous montrons aussi que 
l’ADD proposé ne parvient pas à rétablir pleinement la compétitivité des producteurs nationaux, vis-à-vis 
de leurs homologues étrangers. Nous déterminons la structure ‘optimale’ des ADD sur les importations 
susceptibles de restaurer pleinement la compétitivité des entreprises nationales suite à l’adoption 
unilatérale de sévères politiques de contrôle de la pollution. L’ADD ‘optimal’ prend en considération les 
effets d'équilibre général de la taxe sur le carbone et des taxes à l'importation sur les prix des produits 
domestiques. Dans la plupart des cas, l'impact de leur impact sur les prix à l'importation est plus élevé 
que dans le cas précédent. En conséquence, elles entraînent des distorsions plus élevés sur l'allocation 
des ressources dans l'économie et donc des coûts plus élevés de bien-être des ménages. 
 
Mots clés: Ajustement des droits de douanes, compétitivité, industries à forte intensité 
énergétique, équilibre général, Canada  
Classification JEL: D58, D61, H21, Q4, Q52. 3 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the welfare and sectoral implications of an optimally designed system of 
border tax adjustments (BTAs) to address the loss of competitiveness in a carbon-constrained 
economy. Climate change is a global problem that requires the participation of the major 
polluting countries, hence international cooperation is required. This cooperation is weakened by 
the well-known free-rider problem, whereby some individual countries are better off by taking 
lax actions, while other countries strive to reduce emissions through stringent actions (See 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994). The reason for this is that the use of a carbon tax or of an 
emission trading system, to reduce emissions, entails some costs.  
Stringent environmental policies in participating countries increase the production cost 
and decrease the competitiveness of their energy-intensive industries, not only in international 
markets, but also in their domestic markets. In a world that is increasingly integrated through 
trade, the concern that unilateral actions may harm the competitive position of national 
industries has hindered the adoption of broad-based stringent environmental policies. The loss 
of competitiveness has been the main reason for the U.S having withdrawn from the Kyoto 
protocol in 2002 and also for the lack of decisive actions in other Annex 1 countries. In this 
context, finding remedies to the competitiveness loss would enhance the commitment of 
individual countries to invest lasting efforts in address in climate change.  
Several avenues have been considered in the literature to alleviate the competitiveness 
issue brought about by the limited participation and by the use of market-based instruments to 
curb pollution. Recycling part of the proceeds from permit sales or carbon taxes to the sectors 
most affected by the GHG control policy costs is one of these options.
1 An output-based 
allocation of free emissions allowances to GHG intensive industries is another option that has 
been considered to mitigate the increase in production cost.
2 The drawback of these approaches 
is that while they can alleviate the competitiveness issue faced by GHG intensive industries, they 
also significantly increase the welfare cost of the abatement policy.  
More recently, the use of restrictive trade policies has been suggested to address the loss 
of competitiveness and to force non-participating countries to join the coalition (See for 
example, Barrett, 2003 and Kemfert, 2004). A recurrent proposal on this front is the 
implementation of a border tax adjustment on the imports of energy-intensive goods from 
countries that do not commit to reducing their emissions. An increasing number of jurisdictions 
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around the world are seriously considering using carbon-motivated BTAs.  The US and the EU 
are currently contemplating the implementation of BTAs.
3  
While several definitions of competitiveness loss have been proposed in the literature, in 
this study we view this concept, as far as the domestic market is concerned, not as a loss of 
output by domestic producers, but as a loss of their market shares. The reason for this is that, in 
the absence of technological progress that could mitigate the abatement cost, pollution control is 
very likely to entail a reduction in the production of energy-intensive goods. It follows that 
focussing on output loss may be misleading.  Under these circumstances, eliminating the 
competitive disadvantage of domestic firms amounts to enabling them to restore their market 
shares prior to the carbon tax.  
The ultimate objective of the BTA is to level the playing field between domestic and 
foreign producers, where the former face stringent environmental policies and the latter do not. 
In other words, the BTA is meant to restore the relative price between imports and domestic 
good to the level prior to the implementation of a stringent pollution control. In reality, the idea 
of the BTA is not a new topic (Lockwood and Whalley, 2008). It has been analysed at length 
after the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT in the European Union). Previous studies, 
like Meade (1974) and Grossman (1980), have shown that border tax adjustments on imports 
can be effective at restoring competitiveness in a situation where taxes are differentiated under 
the origin and destination rules. 
It is worth noticing that the proposition for a carbon-motivated BTA occurred after a 
long series of trade liberalization episodes under the auspices of WTO whereby most trade 
barriers have been removed or lowered in several countries. The general consensus is that 
unilateral trade barriers are only a second best option when it comes to address climate change. 
The cost of increasing trade barriers must be taken into consideration; they affect global optimal 
allocation of resources, they can hurt domestic firms that rely on imported intermediate inputs 
and they can harm domestic consumers as well.  
The typical proposal for implementing BTAs involves levying a charge on the imports of 
energy-intensive goods that is proportional to its carbon embodiment, i.e., to the emissions 
released during its production. Nevertheless, its implementation poses several challenges among 
which are the informational constraints on production technology as well as the legality of such 
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measures with WTO rules. Opinions diverge on the legality of the BTA as some authors believe 
that carbon-motivated BTAs do not infringe on any WTO rule
4.  
Besides, the determination of the appropriate level of the tax is also problematic. On the 
one hand, if the tax is set at a very low level, it will fail to restore competitiveness. On the other 
hand, if the tax is set at a very high level, it will not only act as subsidy to domestic firms, but it 
can also harm the economy through the increase in the deadweight loss of import tariffs. In 
other words, if the objective is simply to level the playing field, the border tax should be set at a 
level that is just sufficient to solve the problem. 
Moreover, beyond the practical and legal aspects of the most often proposed approach to 
implementing BTA, one should note its partial equilibrium nature. The rationale for the use of a 
border tax based on the carbon embodiment is that producers in foreign countries should incur 
the same cost as if their production took place in the domestic country. Unfortunately, foreign 
producers do not produce their goods in the domestic economy and so they do not bear the 
other general equilibrium effects of the carbon tax. The assumption that the change in the 
relative price between domestic and import goods depends only on the direct cost of carbon tax 
is misleading because of its partial equilibrium perspective. Carbon taxes entail some general 
equilibrium effects on the output price that need to be considered as well.  
Indeed, on the one hand, on the supply side, the changes in the prices of other inputs, 
i.e., intermediate inputs and primary factors, induced by the domestic carbon tax, can affect the 
price of the domestic good, and hence, its relative price to the imported good. On the other 
hand, on the demand side, the change in total domestic demand caused by the change in factor 
income and by the change in the structure of demand can affect the demand for domestic 
energy-intensive goods, and therefore, it can increase or decrease their prices. It ensues that the 
restoration of the relative price between the domestic and imported goods to its prior level could 
not be achieved uniquely by raising the price of the import good by the direct increase in the cost 
of the domestic good through the carbon tax.  
Several authors have assessed the sectoral and aggregate impacts of BTAs on the imports 
of energy-intensive goods to restore competitiveness. These include, among several others, 
Babiker and Rutherford (2005), Demailly and Quirion (2006), Fischer and Fox (2008), and Ismer 
and Neuhoff (2004). These papers consider a partial-equilibrium type BTA and find that it can 
mitigate the competitiveness problem faced by internationally exposed energy-intensive 
industries.  
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The present study contributes to the above-mentioned literature by assessing, in a general 
equilibrium framework, the implications of an “optimal” BTA that fully restores competitiveness 
between domestic goods and imports in energy-intensive industries. We are not aware of any 
paper that addresses the issue of the optimal BTA and its welfare implications.  
We consider the Canadian economy as a study case; even if the Federal government has 
not yet taken stringent actions to control emissions, some academics have called for the use of 
BTAs when stringent environmental policies will be in effect.
5 We consider a carbon tax system 
as the policy instrument and we determine in a general equilibrium context the “optimal” or 
appropriate border tax adjustments on imports that will level the playing field between domestic 
goods and imports without providing subsidies to domestic producers. We restrict our attention 
to the restoration of competitiveness in the domestic market. We assess the welfare and 
distributional implications across industries. We compare the impacts of the optimal BTA with 
those of the typical partial-equilibrium view of BTA based on the carbon embodiment of the 
imported good.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a brief description of 
the model. In the third section, we discuss the data and describe the simulation. The fourth 
section discusses the results and the last concludes. 
2.  Model description 
We develop a multi-sector static general equilibrium model of the Canadian economy. The 
model is calibrated to the data set of 2004 that captures the transactions among economic agents 
and the carbon dioxide emissions in the economy during that year. It provides an interesting 
representation of the structure of production and consumption in the economy that makes it 
possible to analyze the sectoral and aggregate implications of GHG mitigation policies. It 
captures some important dimensions in the analysis of GHG abatement policies, such as the 
differences in carbon intensities and various degrees of substitution possibilities across energy 
goods. The model features a disaggregation of the economy into 15 industries among which are 
four energy-producing industries (coal, oil and gas, refineries and electricity) and four energy-
intensive industries that do not produce energy, which are pulp and paper, cement, chemicals, 
and metal industry. The fifteen industries produce 19 commodities that include electricity and six 
fossil energy commodities, which are coal, natural gas, gasoline, diesel, liquid petroleum and 
other refined petroleum products.  
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Four types of economic agents are considered: households, firms, the government and 
the rest of the world. Physical capital and labor are mobile across industries. Canada is 
considered a small-open economy that considers world prices of import and export goods as 
given. The model focuses only on carbon dioxide (CO2) and tracks its emissions by source (fossil 
fuels), and by user (industries and households). 
To avoid the black-box syndrome of numerical models, we provide a cursory review of 
the model structure below that will help the reader grasp better the results and the transmission 
mechanisms involved. 
2.1 Production 
Production technology is characterized by constant returns to scale in all industries. It is 
represented by nested separable linear homogeneous constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production functions. Gross output in each industry is a CES function of the index of 
intermediate inputs and of the composite of value-added and energy. The index of valued-added 
and energy is a Cobb-Douglas (C-D) aggregate of labour and the index of capital and energy. 
The composite of capital and energy is a CES function of capital and total energy. The latter is a 
CES composite of electricity and the index of fossil energy, which is in turn a CES composite of 
coal, natural gas and refined petroleum. The index of intermediate inputs is a Leontief aggregate 
of other material inputs. 
The representative firm in each industry considers input and output prices as given and 
maximizes profits in order to determine the optimal levels of input uses and output. The model 
assumes that CO2 emissions related to a given fossil fuel are proportional to its quantity. The 
carbon tax imposed on fossil fuels is based on their content of CO2 and is modelled as an excise 
tax. The tax increases the cost of using fuels and induces firms to pare their use through 
substitution effects.  
Eventually, the imposition of the carbon tax increases the production cost of the firm. 
The magnitude of the increase in the production cost depends on several factors among which 
are the energy intensity of the firm and the ease of substitution among inputs. It is important to 
note that the increase in the production cost will not necessarily translate into an increase in the 
equilibrium output price. The latter is also affected by the change in demand. For example, a 
substantial downward shift in the demand for the product caused by a negative income effect 
can lead to a decline in its equilibrium price despite the increase in the production cost. The 
reverse is also possible, i.e., an upward shift in demand. Yet, from a general equilibrium 
perspective, this income effect may be important. It follows that the appraisal of the change in 8 
 
output price by the partial-equilibrium direct impact of the cost of the carbon tax may be 
misleading. 
2.2 Households 
The representative household derives utility from the consumption of goods. He receives 
income from several sources: primary factor incomes, government transfers and net transfers 
from the rest of the world. He pays income tax and consumption taxes on commodities. He 
saves a constant fraction of his disposable income and devotes the remainder for consumption.  
The representative household’s preferences are represented by a weakly separable utility 
function that is represented by a series nested CES utility functions. At the top level, the utility is 
represented by a CES aggregate of energy commodities and a CES aggregate of non-energy 
commodities. As in the production technology, the household has the possibility to substitute 
among various fossil fuels to produce the energy that will satisfy his needs. The optimal level for 
the demand of each commodity is determined through utility maximization subject to budget 
constraint. 
2.3 Trade and competitiveness 
In this model, we assume that domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes to imports. 
We use an Armington function to capture the differentiation between goods according to their 
origins. Total domestic demand for each commodity (by consumers and firms) is a CES 
composite of the domestic good and of imports. A representative agent, who considers prices as 
given, determines the optimal demand for each commodity by origin through cost minimization.  
The main characteristic of the optimal solution to this optimization problem is that the 
ratio of quantities demanded of the imported good and of the domestic good is a function of 
their price ratio. In particular, the ratio between the demand for the domestic good and the 
demand for the aggregate of imports is negatively related to their price ratio. Everything else 
being equal, an increase in the price of the domestic good increases the ratio between the 
demand for imports and the demand for the domestic good.  
From this, it is easy to see how unilateral pollution control policies that increase the 
relative price of domestic goods vis-à-vis imports can erode the competitiveness of domestic 
industries. Hence, levelling the playing field between domestic and foreign producers will 
amount to restoring the relative price between the two goods to the level prior to the imposition 
of the carbon tax. If trade policy is to be used as a policy instrument to restore competitiveness, 
it will amount to imposing an import charge equivalent to the change in the domestic good price. 
Following our previous discussions, using the partial-equilibrium direct impact of the carbon tax 9 
 
on production cost to determine the appropriate charges on imports to restore competitiveness 
may be misleading. 
Besides, on the supply side we also assume that domestic sales are imperfect substitutes 
to exports. We model this imperfect substitution on the supply side by using a constant elasticity 
of transformation (CET) function. The representative firm of each industry determines the 
optimal deliveries in each market by maximizing the revenue from the sales of their gross output 
subject to the technological constraint represented by the CET function. The ratio of exports to 
domestic sales depends on the relative price of the two goods; the lower the domestic price, the 
lower the ratio of domestic deliveries to exports. It is worth mentioning that, with the 
assumption of the small country, the prices of the export goods are exogenous. Changes in the 
volume of exports will only occur either through the changes in the prices of domestic goods 
(substitution effect) or through the changes in gross output that are brought about by the 
changes in the volume of inputs used. 
2.4 Government, equilibrium conditions and closure rules 
The government’s role is very simple in this model. It derives revenue from taxes on primary 
factor incomes, production and consumption taxes, trade taxes and the proceeds of the carbon 
taxes. It distributes transfers to households and provides a public good that is produced through 
the purchase of commodities in the market. The provision of the public good is fixed in real 
terms. The government finances its expenditures with the tax revenue and its saving is 
endogenous.  
The model determines endogenously the values of prices and quantities such that all 
markets clear simultaneously. The price of the domestic good must adjust to bring about 
equilibrium between supply and demand in that market. Equilibrium is achieved in the labour 
and capital markets through changes in, respectively, the wage rate and the rental rate of capital. 
Foreign saving is exogenous and the real exchange rate adjusts to bring about balance-of-
payments equilibrium. Finally, expenditures on investment goods are funded by total saving, and 
we assume that the share of each commodity in total investment spending is fixed. 
3.  Data, calibration and description of the simulations 
As is usual in CGE modeling, the model is calibrated to the economic transactions and emissions 
of a benchmark year, 2004 in this study. We use the benchmark data along with extraneous 
elasticities to calibrate the other behavioural parameters so as to reproduce the benchmark 10 
 
equilibrium.
6 We run three simulations with the model. The first one is the reference simulation 
against which we liken the results obtained in the other two. 
In the first simulation, called NO-BTA, we impose a carbon tax of $40 per tonne of CO2 
on all fossil fuels used by all economic agents in the economy. We do not apply any BTA on 
imports. Moreover, no distinction is made on the origin of the fossil fuel. Domestically produced 
fossil fuels, as well as imports are subjected to the carbon tax. In the same vein, no domestic user 
is exempted from paying the carbon tax. In order to disentangle properly the welfare cost of the 
policies, we elect to return the proceeds of the carbon tax in all simulations to the government 
that could use the revenue to increase its balance.  
In the second simulation called PE-BTA, in addition to the carbon tax, imports of 
energy-intensive goods must pay an additional charge, the BTA, which adds to the existing 
tariffs. We consider a BTA that is equivalent to the direct partial-equilibrium increase in the 
production cost incurred by domestic firms, which produce the same good. The BTA is 
unilaterally carried out as an excise tax on the imports of energy-intensive goods. The BTA 
depends on its carbon embodiment and on the carbon tax rate paid by domestic firms. The 
carbon embodiment depends on the technology used to produce the good. Incomplete 
information on foreign firms’ technology makes it difficult to determine the carbon embodiment 
of imported goods. Most of the BTA propositions suggest using the carbon embodiment rates 
of domestic goods. The carbon embodiment of a good is the total amount (direct and indirect) 
of CO2 emissions that is required in the production of one unit of output. Let us denote by t and 
ei, respectively, the carbon tax rate ($ per tonne of CO2) and the carbon embodiment of the good 
(tonne of CO2 per unit of output). The BTA levied on the imported energy-intensive good is: 
t.ei.
7  We use the data on carbon embodiments of domestic energy-intensive industries produced 
by the Canadian Federal Statistics Office, Statistics Canada. 
In a multi-country setting, the BTA should be applied on the imports of energy-intensive 
goods from countries with lax environmental policies. It is unnecessary to make that distinction 
in the context of a single-country model. The production cost of energy-intensive goods would 
increase in the other countries as well, should they implement stringent environmental policies. It 
follows that the import price of the goods from countries with stringent policies would also 
increase.
8 Therefore, in the context of our single-country model, we elect to implement the BTA 
on total imports of each energy-intensive good, irrespective of origin. As mentioned before, the 
                                                 
6 See Table 1 for the characteristics of the economy and Table 2 for the main elasticities used.   
7 We assume that the BTA is levied on the import price gross of the existing tariff. In other words, the government 
does not derive additional tariff revenue from the BTA. 
8 It is assumed implicitly that there is no difference in the production technology of energy-intensive goods in all 
foreign countries. 11 
 
following energy-intensive goods are considered in the present model: pulp and paper; chemical 
products; cement and non metallic products; and metal products. The proceeds of the carbon tax 
and of the BTA are entirely recycled back to the government for the same reason referred to 
earlier in this paper.  
In the third simulation called GE-BTA, in addition to the carbon tax, instead of applying 
an exogenously set BTA, we determine endogenously the appropriate or “optimal” BTA that will 
entirely restore competitiveness in each domestic energy-intensive industry. As discussed earlier, 
restoring competitiveness amounts to bringing the relative price between the domestic good and 
imports back to the level prior to the imposition of the carbon tax. In this simulation, the BTA is 
an ad valorem tax on imports that adds to the existing tariff. As in the previous simulation, the 
proceeds of the carbon tax and of the BTA are returned to the government.  
In the next sub-sections, we discuss the simulation results and devote some effort to 
delineating the underlying transmission mechanisms. General equilibrium model results may be 
difficult to understand without some explanations as to their rationale. We purposely concentrate 
our discussion on the results in Simulation 1, and we then highlight the differences with the two 
other cases. In all simulations, the results are reported as percentage deviations from benchmark 
values unless otherwise mentioned.  
4.  Simulation results 
4.1 Simulation 1 (NO-BTA): Impact of a $40/ton carbon tax with no border tax 
adjustment 
The imposition of the carbon tax on the use of all fossil fuels from all origins (domestic and 
foreign) increases the prices of these goods and gives incentives to their buyers to substitute 
away from them and reduce their use. Firms and households reduce their CO2 emissions by, 
respectively, 22.8 and 13.1 % as shown in Table 3. The increase in the price of fossil fuels drives 
the production cost up and leads to a fall in output, especially in energy-intensive industries. For 
example, output falls in the chemical and the pulp and paper industries by, respectively, 18.5 and 
6.9 %. The reduction in the demand for energy by energy-intensive industries leads to a fall in 
the demand for fossil energy products. Output declines in coal and refined petroleum product 
industries by, respectively, 44 and 14.6 % (Table 4). 
The increase in the production cost of energy-intensive industries affects both exports 
and imports in these industries. On the supply side, the fall in output triggered by the reduction 
in the use of energy has a negative impact on both exports and domestic sales. The magnitude of 
the fall in exports in these industries varies between 2.0% in the cement industry and 22.1% in 12 
 
the chemical industry (Table 5). The adjustment in the domestic sales of these products is also 
affected by the changes on the demand side, as their prices are determined endogenously, in 
contrast with the export goods whose prices are exogenous because of the small open economy 
assumption.  
On the demand side, as the price of domestically produced energy-intensive goods 
increases, users substitute away from these goods towards imports whose prices have not 
changed following the implementation of the carbon tax. For example, as shown in Table 7, the 
price of domestic goods increases by 4.3 and 1.9% in, respectively, the chemical, and the pulp 
and paper industries following the implementation of the carbon tax. Domestic producers are 
thus put at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis imports in their domestic market. The final 
impact on the demand for imports and the demand for the domestic goods depend on the 
magnitude of the income effects. In the presence of a strong positive income effect, the demand 
for domestic good can increase despite the negative substitution effect.  
Still, in the energy-intensive industries, domestic sales will be more negatively affected 
than imports because of the competitive disadvantage, irrespective of the magnitude of the 
income effect. When both demands decrease, the magnitude of the change will be larger for 
domestic sales. For example, as shown in Table 6, the demand for domestic goods decreases in 
the four energy-intensive industries. The chemical industry is hit the hardest; its domestic 
demand drops by 15.2% in comparison with the benchmark situation. At the same time, import 
demand increases in the four industries (Table 6). It is interesting to note that the increase in 
imports occurs despite a negative income effect, as total demand falls in all four industries. As 
noted earlier, total demand for each commodity is a CES aggregate of domestic demand and 
imports. This suggests that the positive substitution effect in the benefit of imports, which is 
induced by the change in the relative prices, is larger than the negative income effect driven by 
the fall in the demand for the composite. 
Besides, the changes in relative prices brought about by the carbon tax reduce the wage rate 
and the rental rate of capital that fall, respectively, by 1.0 and 3.4%. Household income falls, and 
their real total consumption declines as well by 1.6%. As a result, households experience lower 
welfare. The change in household welfare measured by the equivalent variation expressed as a 
percentage of the benchmark GDP at market price is -0.9%. Finally, the change in the 
composition of final demand following the imposition of the carbon tax leads to a fall in real 
GDP by 0.27%. 
4.2 Simulation 2 (PE BTA): $40 carbon tax with partial-equilibrium BTA based on 13 
 
carbon embodiment of imports  
In this simulation, in addition to the carbon tax, an additional charge is levied on imports of 
energy-intensive goods. It is important to note here that the charge is levied on the imports of 
non-fossil energy-intensive goods only. The use of the latter goods does not release emissions; 
nevertheless, their production in their country of origin entails the use of inputs, which releases 
emissions.
9 As argued earlier, this BTA is of a partial equilibrium nature, as it does not take into 
consideration its direct and indirect impacts and those of the carbon tax on the price of domestic 
goods. 
The implementation of the BTA drives the import prices of energy-intensive goods up 
by some magnitude, which varies between 1.8 and 6.9% (Table 7). Consequently, imports of 
energy-intensive goods decrease in contrast to an increase in the previous simulation with no 
BTA. As argued above, the BTA based on carbon embodiment of the imported good will not 
necessary remove the competitive disadvantage of the domestic producers, vis-à-vis their foreign 
peers. The BTA may over- or, sometimes, under-correct for the competitive disadvantage of the 
carbon tax. As shown in Table 6, the imposition of the partial- equilibrium BTA does not 
completely solve the competitiveness problem in the chemical and metal industries. Domestic 
sales in these two industries still fall more than imports as in the previous simulation without 
BTA. 
Figures in Table 6 suggest that the ratio of domestic sales to imports fall in both chemical 
and metal industries by, respectively, 12.5 and 1.7 %. The ratio of domestic sales to imports 
decreases despite the increase in the import price in the two industries by, respectively, 2.2 and 
1.8% (Table 7). This result cast light on the idea that an exogenously determined levy on the 
imports of energy-intensive goods may not be sufficient to counteract the rise of the price of 
domestic goods.  
In contrast, the partial-equilibrium BTA is sufficient to eliminate the competitive 
disadvantage in the pulp and paper industry, and in the cement industry. It has even over-
corrected for the disadvantage, since the ratio of domestic sales to imports in both industries 
increases by, respectively, 1.2 and 24.5 %. The large magnitude of the change in the cement 
industry is explained by the size of the change in import price. Because of the high carbon 
embodiment in the cement product, its import price increases by 6.9%, and its import volume 
falls by 16.6%, while domestic sales increase by 7.8% in the same industry. Once more, the 
adjustment in the cement industry is an illustration of the idea that a partial-equilibrium 
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implementation of BTA may over protect domestic industries and introduce further distortions 
in resource allocation in the economy. 
Note that the BTA increases production cost in all energy-intensive industries since these 
industries use a significant share of their own output as intermediate input. The effective rate of 
protection granted to these industries by the BTA decreases with the share of their own output 
used as intermediate input and the share of imports in total demand for the good. As indicated in 
Table 7, the increase in the price of the domestic good with the partial-equilibrium BTA is larger 
than the one in the previous simulation without BTA.  
Besides, the implementation of the BTA does benefit domestic producers in the energy-
intensive industries, as output falls less in comparison with the previous simulation (Table 4). 
This result is in line with the one found in Fischer and Fox (2008) in their partial-equilibrium 
analysis of the impact of BTA in Canada. The startling result in the present simulation is that 
output increases by 7.4% in the cement industry thanks to the high BTA, while it decreased in 
the former simulation. Indeed, because of the large impact of the BTA on import price in the 
cement industry, import volume falls drastically, and domestic firms are able to increase their 
market share by augmenting domestic sales by 7.8%. Moreover, because of the jointness in the 
production of domestic good and exports, the sales of cement to the rest of the world increase. 
Exports fall in the other industries in comparison with the simulation with no BTA, with a lower 
magnitude though. 
As energy-intensive industries are now less affected by the carbon tax in the presence of 
the BTA, their emissions are less reduced; industrial emissions fall slightly less in comparison 
with the previous simulation, -22.5 vs. -22.8%. Overall, total emissions (including households) 
decrease by 20.9 vs. 21.1%.  
Besides, as import prices of energy-intensive goods increase, production cost increases in 
several industries, and the returns to labor and capital fall more in comparison with the 
simulation without BTA. Thus, household disposable income decreases in addition to the 
increase in the consumption prices of goods brought about by the carbon tax and the BTA. 
Their real total consumption falls more and they enjoy lower welfare in comparison to the 
previous simulation. The equivalent variation as a percentage of benchmark GDP is -1.04, which 
is 14% higher than the one obtained in the simulation without BTA. 
4.3 Simulation 3 (GE BTA): $40 carbon tax with endogenously determined BTA 
In this simulation, we determine endogenously the “optimal” BTA that eliminates the 
competitive disadvantage of domestic producers in the energy-intensive industries created by the 15 
 
carbon tax. Referring to the complete elimination of the disadvantage, we seek to “level the 
playing field” between imports and domestic goods by bringing their relative price to the level at 
which it was prior to the implementation of the carbon tax. As there is an isomorphism between 
relative price and relative quantity
10, the optimal BTA will bring the ratio of imports to domestic 
sales to their level prior to the carbon tax as well. It is important to note here that with the 
optimal BTA, in a general equilibrium framework, the demand for domestic good might fall or 
might increase. The most important objective is to set the BTA at a level such that in the 
presence of carbon taxes, the prices of imports and domestic sales change by the same 
magnitude.  
Under these circumstances, the BTA completely addresses the competitive disadvantage 
of domestic producers, vis-à-vis their foreign peers. Moreover, it does not over protect domestic 
industries by increasing the ratio of domestic sales to imports in energy- intensive industries. The 
general-equilibrium nature of the BTA stems from the fact that its magnitude considers its direct 
and indirect impacts on the prices of domestic goods, as well as those of the carbon tax. 
As expected and shown in Table 6, the general-equilibrium BTA addresses exactly the 
competitiveness problem in energy industries. Imports and domestic sales decrease by exactly the 
same magnitudes that vary between 0.8, in the cement industry, and 6.0, in the chemical industry. 
The sizes of these changes are in relation with the percentage changes in the import prices 
induced by the BTA. The largest increase is observed in the chemical industry where the import 
price increases by 7.7% in reference with the benchmark situation.  
The adjustment in that industry is in sharp contrast with the one observed in the 
previous simulation with partial-equilibrium BTA, in which the import price of chemicals 
increased by only 2.2%, which was not sufficient to eliminate the competitiveness disadvantage. 
The same intuition applies for the metal industry where the optimal BTA is now 2.4% in 
contrast with 1.8% in the previous simulation. 
In all energy-intensive industries, but the cement industry, the impact of general-
equilibrium BTA on the import price is larger than that of the partial-equilibrium BTA. In the 
cement industry, because of its high carbon embodiment, the import charge is so high that it 
offers significant protection to domestic producers such that they increase their output despite 
the carbon tax. The optimal BTA required for restoring competitiveness in the Cement industry 
increases its import price by 0.6% vs. 6.9% for the BTA based on carbon embodiment. 
It is worth mentioning that despite the leveling of the playing field with the optimal BTA, 
                                                 
10 This is due to the Armington assumption. 16 
 
output does fall in energy-intensive industries, though by a lower magnitude in comparison with 
the simulation with no BTA. This is another confirmation of the precedent observation 
concerning the beneficial impact of BTA on output in energy–intensive industries. In 
comparison with the previous simulation, the general-equilibrium BTA is more beneficial to the 
chemical and metal industries than the partial-equilibrium; output falls less in these industries in 
comparison with the simulation with partial-equilibrium BTA (Table 4). Still, the general-
equilibrium BTA does not benefit that much the pulp and paper, and cement industries 
compared with the situation where the BTA is based on the carbon embodiment of the imported 
good. 
The differences in the sectoral impacts of the general-equilibrium and partial-equilibrium 
BTAs are not surprising given that the partial-equilibrium BTA has over-protected the pulp and 
paper and the cement industries. It thus makes sense that applying a BTA that levels the playing 
field between imports and domestic goods in these industries will favor less output.  
As with the previous simulations, exports follow the same pattern as gross output. 
Exports in all energy-intensive industries fall less in comparison with the simulation with no 
BTA. Moreover, compared with the partial-equilibrium BTA, exports decrease less in the 
chemical and metal industries, and fall more in the pulp and paper and cement industries. 
Overall, the implementation of the optimal BTA leads to a larger decrease in the returns to 
labor and capital in comparison with the two previous simulations. As consumption prices 
increase, households decrease their real total consumption by 2.1% in reference to the 
benchmark; they enjoy lower welfare in comparison with the other simulations. The equivalent 
variation expressed in percentage of GDP is -1.19% in this simulation vs. -0.91 in the simulation 
with no BTA. The optimal BTA increases the welfare cost of the carbon tax by about 30%. The 
reason for the higher welfare cost of the general-equilibrium BTA is that the larger magnitudes 
of the import charges required to eliminate the competitive disadvantage introduces more 
distortions in resource allocation than in the previous simulations. 
5.  Sensitivity analysis 
To check the robustness of our qualitative results, we perform some sensitivity analyses of our 
findings with respect to the values of the elasticities in production technology, household 
preferences, Armington, and CET function. We perform two other simulations with different 
values of elasticities in comparison to the base case. In the first simulation with low elasticities, 
we decrease all elasticities by 50%. In the second simulation with high elasticities, we increase all 
elasticities by 50%. The sensitivity analysis results presented in Table 8 confirm the robustness of 17 
 
our qualitative findings. The partial-equilibrium BTA does not necessarily fully restore 
competitiveness in all energy industries and it provides over-protection to some industries. The 
simulations also suggest that the optimal BTA introduces more distortions into resource 
allocation as the welfare cost is higher than without BTA and with partial-equilibrium BTA. 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have analyzed the impacts of implementing a $40/tonne of CO2 carbon tax 
along with a unilateral border tax adjustment on the imports of energy-intensive goods. We have 
considered two types of BTA: the partial-equilibrium BTA and the general-equilibrium BTA. 
The partial-equilibrium BTA is determined exogenously and depends on the carbon embodiment 
of the energy-intensive good. In contrast, the general-equilibrium BTA is determined 
endogenously to completely remove the competitive disadvantage of domestic energy-intensive 
industries vis-à-vis their foreign peers. We have developed a multi-sector static CGE model of 
the Canadian economy and have run several simulations to examine the sectoral and aggregate 
effects of the reform. To disentangle properly the welfare impact of the BTA, we have 
considered a closure rule that returns the carbon tax proceeds to the government rather than to 
households. 
Our simulation results show that BTAs could reduce the competitive disadvantage of 
domestic producers in energy-intensive industries vis-à-vis their foreign peers. Their output and 
domestic sales fall less in comparison to the situation where no BTA is implemented. Still, 
leveling the playing field between domestic producers and foreign peers comes at a higher 
welfare cost than the one obtained in a situation with no BTA. 
Our results also suggest that a partial-equilibrium BTA that is based on the carbon 
embodiment of the good may not be sufficient to remove completely the competitive 
disadvantage in some energy-intensive industries. Their domestic sales may still fall more than 
imports. The reason for this is that the exogenously determined BTA does not take into account 
the general equilibrium effects of the import charges and of the carbon taxes on the prices of 
domestic goods. Our results also indicate that the exogenously determined BTA may over 
protect some domestic producers to the point where their domestic sales rise in the presence of 
a carbon tax while imports fall. 
In contrast, the optimal BTA is set such that the ratio of domestic sales to imports is 
kept to its value prior to the reform. The required percentage changes in the import prices are 
generally higher than the ones determined exogenously. Consequently, output falls less in energy-
intensive industries in comparison with a situation with no BTA and households incur a higher 18 
 
welfare loss that could be 30% higher than in a situation with no BTA.  
Overall, our simulation results suggest that, while BTAs could address partially or 
completely the competitive disadvantage of domestic energy-intensive industries in the presence 
of carbon taxes, they also entail some welfare cost to households, which deserves to be 
considered. In both BTA schemes considered, the level of emissions abatement is slightly lower 
than that without additional import charges. 
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(tonne of CO2 
per $ million 
of output)
Agriculture 2.1% 1.8% 2.0% 0.16 3.0% 1.7
Oil and gas 6.3% 4.7% 10.8% 0.42 16.2% 1.2
Coal 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 2.15 0.2% 1.3
Other mining 1.0% 0.8% 1.9% 0.38 1.3% 0.9
Power generation 2.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.04 24.8% 4.8
Gas pipelines 0.7% 0.1% 0.7% 0.05 1.9% 0.1
Pulp and paper* 0.9% 1.6% 4.2% 0.49 2.1% 2.3
Paper manufacturing & 
printing 0.5% 0.9% 0.5% 0.41 0.1% 0.5
Other manufacturing 8.2% 43.9% 38.5% 1.50 2.2% 0.8
Refined petroleum 
products 0.4% 1.3% 2.2% 1.28 5.8% 11.5
Chemical & rubber 
products* 2.2% 11.0% 7.9% 1.20 3.8% 1.7
Cement & non metallic 
products* 0.5% 1.0% 0.6% 0.43 3.5% 4.0
Metal industry* 3.4% 16.8% 11.9% 1.43 5.6% 1.3
Transport 3.1% 1.9% 4.5% 0.15 10.1% 2.3
Services 68.4% 13.5% 13.8% 0.05 19.2% 0.4
* Energy-intensive industry
Source: Statistcis Canad and Owner calculations
Table 2: Ranges of the valuses of the elasticities of substitution in the base case
Min Max
Index of value added energy and index of intermediate inputs 0.2 0.7
Index of capital energy and labour 0.4 0.7
Capital and Index of energy 0.3 0.6
Electricity and Index of fossil fuels 0.45 0.9
Among fossil fuels 0.5 0.9
Among non-motive fossil fuels 0.5 0.9
Index of material inputs and  index of motive fossil fuels 0.3 0.6
Among motive fossil fuels 0.5 0.9
Household 0.4 1.7
Armington function 2 4.5





GDP at market price ‐0.27 ‐0.28 ‐0.30
Total real imports ‐1.04 ‐2.19 ‐3.10
Total real exports ‐0.93 ‐1.95 ‐2.76
Real exchange rate 0.40 0.39 0.43
Rental rate of capital ‐3.42 ‐3.63 ‐3.84
Nominal wage rate ‐1.04 ‐1.32 ‐1.65
Household disposable income ‐1.19 ‐1.41 ‐1.67
Household real consumption ‐1.58 ‐1.82 ‐2.07
Equivalent variation as % of GDP ‐0.91 ‐1.04 ‐1.19
Industrial emissions ‐22.76 ‐22.51 ‐22.17
Household emissions ‐13.14 ‐13.28 ‐13.45






















Agriculture 3.5 1.3 ‐0.8 ‐1.3 ‐3.2 ‐5.0 ‐0.1 0.0 0.1 14.1 13.9 13.7
Oil and gas ‐5.8 ‐5.0 ‐3.9 ‐10.4 ‐9.6 ‐8.6 ‐1.7 ‐1.8 ‐2.0 16.9 16.7 16.5
Coal ‐44.0 ‐43.4 ‐43.1 ‐47.2 ‐46.5 ‐46.3 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐0.2 15.4 15.3 15.1
Other mining ‐3.4 ‐2.1 ‐2.1 ‐9.2 ‐8.0 ‐7.9 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐0.2 16.4 16.3 16.0
Power generation ‐5.1 ‐5.0 ‐5.0 ‐27.2 ‐27.1 ‐27.1 6.2 6.0 5.8 97.5 97.3 97.1
Gas pipelines ‐11.2 ‐10.8 ‐10.5 ‐16.9 ‐16.5 ‐16.2 ‐1.3 ‐1.5 ‐1.7 16.8 16.6 16.4
Pulp and paper* ‐6.9 ‐4.9 ‐6.9 ‐11.9 ‐9.9 ‐11.7 0.8 1.1 1.4 12.1 11.9 11.7
Paper manufacturing & printing 0.3 ‐0.5 ‐1.0 ‐5.1 ‐5.8 ‐6.2 ‐0.4 ‐0.1 0.1 15.4 15.3 15.1
Other manufacturing 6.3 3.2 0.8 0.7 ‐2.1 ‐4.3 ‐0.5 ‐0.3 ‐0.1 14.5 14.4 14.2
Refined petroleum products ‐14.6 ‐14.6 ‐14.6 ‐23.0 ‐22.9 ‐22.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 24.6 24.5 24.5
Chemical & rubber products* ‐18.5 ‐16.9 ‐12.3 ‐25.5 ‐23.8 ‐19.1 2.2 2.8 4.1 22.2 22.0 21.9
Cement & non metallic products* ‐1.2 7.4 ‐1.0 ‐7.9 0.3 ‐7.6 0.4 0.8 0.4 17.3 17.1 16.9
Metal industry* ‐5.2 ‐4.1 ‐3.7 ‐16.5 ‐15.5 ‐15.1 0.6 1.1 1.1 33.2 33.1 32.8
Transport ‐4.1 ‐4.0 ‐4.0 ‐12.6 ‐12.6 ‐12.8 1.4 1.3 1.1 16.7 16.6 16.4
Services 0.3 0.4 0.4 ‐8.8 ‐8.8 ‐8.8 ‐0.7 ‐0.8 ‐1.0 16.2 16.0 15.8
* Energy‐intensive industry















Agriculture 3.5 1.3 ‐0.8 3.7 1.3 ‐1.0 3.4 1.2 ‐0.8
Coal ‐44.0 ‐43.4 ‐43.1 ‐44.0 ‐43.2 ‐42.9 ‐44.1 ‐43.6 ‐43.4
Other mining ‐3.4 ‐2.1 ‐2.1 ‐3.3 ‐1.9 ‐1.7 ‐3.5 ‐2.3 ‐2.5
Power generation ‐5.1 ‐5.0 ‐5.0 ‐15.9 ‐15.5 ‐15.2 ‐4.5 ‐4.3 ‐4.4
Gas pipelines ‐11.2 ‐10.8 ‐10.5 ‐8.9 ‐8.2 ‐7.5 ‐12.2 ‐12.0 ‐11.8
Pulp and paper* ‐6.9 ‐4.9 ‐6.9 ‐8.3 ‐7.0 ‐9.4 ‐4.9 ‐2.0 ‐3.5
Paper manufacturing & 
printing 0.3 ‐0.5 ‐1.0 1.0 ‐0.4 ‐1.2 0.2 ‐0.5 ‐0.9
Other manufacturing 6.3 3.2 0.8 7.3 3.8 1.0 4.8 2.4 0.4
Chemical & rubber 
products* ‐18.5 ‐16.9 ‐12.3 ‐22.1 ‐21.4 ‐19.0 ‐15.2 ‐12.8 ‐6.0
Cement & non metallic 
products* ‐1.2 7.4 ‐1.0 ‐2.0 5.8 ‐1.9 ‐1.0 7.8 ‐0.8
Metal industry* ‐5.2 ‐4.1 ‐3.7 ‐6.3 ‐6.1 ‐5.8 ‐3.8 ‐1.9 ‐1.3
Transport ‐4.1 ‐4.0 ‐4.0 ‐6.7 ‐6.5 ‐6.2 ‐3.0 ‐3.0 ‐3.2
Services 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.8 2.0 2.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Crude oil ‐5.0 ‐4.3 ‐3.2 ‐2.7 ‐1.7 ‐0.3 ‐7.8 ‐7.3 ‐6.6
Natural gas ‐6.5 ‐5.8 ‐4.7 ‐2.2 ‐1.2 0.2 ‐10.7 ‐10.3 ‐9.5
Gasoline ‐12.9 ‐12.9 ‐13.0 ‐17.0 ‐16.8 ‐16.7 ‐12.2 ‐12.2 ‐12.4
Diesel ‐12.8 ‐12.8 ‐12.8 ‐17.0 ‐16.9 ‐16.8 ‐11.7 ‐11.7 ‐11.7
Liquid petroleum ‐19.0 ‐18.8 ‐18.4 ‐14.9 ‐14.9 ‐14.9 ‐21.9 ‐21.6 ‐21.0
Other refined petroleum 
products ‐21.3 ‐21.2 ‐20.9 ‐14.1 ‐14.0 ‐14.0 ‐23.9 ‐23.8 ‐23.5
* Energy‐intensive industry



























Agriculture 3.4 1.2 ‐0.7 3.4 1.2 ‐0.8 2.8 1.0 ‐0.2 0.6 0.2 ‐0.6 ‐1.7 ‐2.0 ‐2.5
Coal ‐45.3 ‐45.0 ‐45.1 ‐44.1 ‐43.6 ‐43.4 ‐44.4 ‐44.3 ‐44.4 0.3 0.7 1.1 ‐75.0 ‐75.1 ‐75.1
Other mining ‐3.7 ‐2.6 ‐3.1 ‐3.5 ‐2.3 ‐2.5 ‐4.0 ‐3.3 ‐4.3 0.4 1.0 1.8 ‐1.8 ‐1.9 ‐1.9
Power generation ‐3.4 ‐3.2 ‐3.3 ‐4.5 ‐4.3 ‐4.4 27.2 26.5 25.3 ‐31.7 ‐30.8 ‐29.6 ‐3.0 ‐3.1 ‐3.2
Gas pipelines ‐12.5 ‐12.3 ‐12.2 ‐12.2 ‐12.0 ‐11.8 ‐19.3 ‐19.9 ‐20.8 7.1 8.0 9.0 ‐15.5 ‐15.5 ‐15.6
Pulp and paper* ‐2.2 ‐2.4 ‐3.5 ‐4.9 ‐2.0 ‐3.5 3.4 ‐3.2 ‐3.5 ‐8.2 1.2 0.0 ‐3.7 ‐6.0 ‐6.8
Paper manufacturing 
& printing
‐0.4 ‐0.6 ‐0.8 0.2 ‐0.5 ‐0.9 ‐1.8 ‐0.8 ‐0.3 1.9 0.3 ‐0.6 ‐1.5 ‐2.0 ‐2.5
Other manufacturing 1.6 0.6 ‐0.3 4.8 2.4 0.4 ‐0.5 ‐0.7 ‐0.9 5.3 3.1 1.3 ‐1.2 ‐1.7 ‐2.2
Chemical & rubber 
products* ‐5.7 ‐6.1 ‐6.1 ‐15.2 ‐12.8 ‐6.0 2.5 ‐0.3 ‐6.0 ‐17.7 ‐12.5 0.0 ‐4.6 ‐7.1 ‐12.7
Cement & non 
metallic products* ‐0.3 0.3 ‐0.8 ‐1.0 7.8 ‐0.8 1.4 ‐16.6 ‐0.8 ‐2.4 24.5 0.0 ‐2.4 ‐5.8 ‐3.2
Metal industry* ‐0.3 ‐0.9 ‐1.3 ‐3.8 ‐1.9 ‐1.3 2.1 ‐0.2 ‐1.3 ‐5.9 ‐1.7 0.0 ‐2.7 ‐5.0 ‐5.7
Transport ‐1.8 ‐2.0 ‐2.2 ‐3.0 ‐3.0 ‐3.2 5.9 5.1 3.9 ‐8.9 ‐8.1 ‐7.1 ‐4.4 ‐4.3 ‐4.3
Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 ‐3.2 ‐3.6 ‐4.2 3.4 3.9 4.5 ‐0.8 ‐0.9 ‐0.9
Crude oil ‐12.5 ‐12.4 ‐12.2 ‐7.8 ‐7.3 ‐6.6 ‐18.3 ‐18.7 ‐19.2 10.5 11.4 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural gas ‐12.5 ‐12.1 ‐11.5 ‐10.7 ‐10.3 ‐9.5 ‐27.3 ‐27.7 ‐28.1 16.5 17.4 18.6 ‐15.5 ‐15.5 ‐15.6
Gasoline ‐11.4 ‐11.6 ‐11.7 ‐12.2 ‐12.2 ‐12.4 ‐0.4 ‐1.0 ‐1.7 ‐11.8 ‐11.2 ‐10.6 ‐10.6 ‐10.8 ‐11.0
Diesel ‐10.6 ‐10.7 ‐10.8 ‐11.7 ‐11.7 ‐11.7 1.6 1.3 0.7 ‐13.3 ‐12.9 ‐12.4 ‐7.0 ‐7.2 ‐7.5
Liquid petroleum ‐23.1 ‐22.8 ‐22.0 ‐21.9 ‐21.6 ‐21.0 ‐35.6 ‐34.9 ‐33.1 13.6 13.3 12.1 ‐29.3 ‐29.5 ‐30.0
Other refined 
petroleum products ‐28.7 ‐28.6 ‐28.2 ‐23.9 ‐23.8 ‐23.5 ‐41.9 ‐41.8 ‐41.1 18.1 18.1 17.6 ‐35.5 ‐35.7 ‐36.0
* Energy‐intensive industry




















Agriculture ‐0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐0.1 0.0 0.1 ‐0.1 0.0 0.1
Coal ‐0.1 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐0.3 ‐0.4 221.4 221.4 221.3
Other mining ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.4 ‐0.1 ‐0.2 ‐0.3
Power generation 6.6 6.4 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.1 5.9
Gas pipelines ‐1.8 ‐2.1 ‐2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐1.8 ‐2.1 ‐2.4 ‐1.8 ‐2.0 ‐2.3
Pulp and paper* 1.9 2.7 3.2 0.0 2.9 3.2 1.9 ‐0.3 0.0 1.2 2.7 3.2
Paper manufacturing & 
printing ‐0.4 ‐0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐0.4 ‐0.1 0.1 ‐0.3 0.0 0.1
Other manufacturing ‐1.2 ‐0.7 ‐0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐1.2 ‐0.7 ‐0.3 ‐0.5 ‐0.3 ‐0.1
Chemical & rubber 
products* 4.3 5.3 7.7 0.0 2.2 7.7 4.3 3.1 0.0 1.9 3.6 7.7
Cement & non metallic 
products* 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.0 6.9 0.6 0.5 ‐5.9 0.0 0.4 2.6 0.6
Metal industry* 1.3 2.2 2.4 0.0 1.8 2.4 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 2.0 2.4
Transport 2.0 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4
Services ‐0.8 ‐0.9 ‐1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐0.8 ‐0.9 ‐1.0 ‐0.7 ‐0.8 ‐1.0
Crude oil ‐2.7 ‐2.9 ‐3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐2.7 ‐2.9 ‐3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural gas ‐4.5 ‐4.7 ‐5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐4.5 ‐4.7 ‐5.0 23.6 23.3 23.1
Gasoline 2.8 2.7 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 25.8 25.7 25.6
Diesel 3.2 3.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.1 3.0 21.0 20.9 20.8
Liquid petroleum ‐4.2 ‐4.1 ‐3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐4.2 ‐4.1 ‐3.6 32.1 32.2 32.6
Other refined petroleum 
products ‐5.8 ‐5.8 ‐5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 ‐5.8 ‐5.8 ‐5.7 44.8 44.9 45.0
* Energy‐intensive industry












GDP at market price ‐0.18 ‐0.19 ‐0.20 ‐0.35 ‐0.36 ‐0.38
Total real imports ‐0.63 ‐1.24 ‐1.83 ‐1.33 ‐3.02 ‐4.11
Total real exports ‐0.56 ‐1.11 ‐1.63 ‐1.19 ‐2.69 ‐3.66
Real exchange rate 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.37 0.36 0.41
Rental rate of capital ‐3.71 ‐3.94 ‐4.24 ‐3.20 ‐3.40 ‐3.55
Wage rate ‐1.09 ‐1.34 ‐1.70 ‐0.97 ‐1.27 ‐1.57
Household disposable income ‐1.27 ‐1.47 ‐1.76 ‐1.12 ‐1.35 ‐1.58
Household real consumption ‐1.66 ‐1.90 ‐2.18 ‐1.49 ‐1.73 ‐1.95
EV in % of GDP at market ‐0.94 ‐1.07 ‐1.23 ‐0.87 ‐1.01 ‐1.13
Ratio of domestic sales to imports in pulp and paper industry* ‐4.34 0.36 0.00 ‐11.76 2.45 0.00
Ratio of domestic sales to imports in chemical industry* ‐9.35 ‐6.70 0.00 ‐25.06 ‐17.51 0.00
Ratio of domestic sales to imports in cement industry* ‐1.25 12.42 0.00 ‐3.37 35.99 0.00
Ratio of domestic sales to imports in in metal industry* ‐3.61 ‐1.49 0.00 ‐7.38 ‐0.90 0.00
* Energy‐intensive industry
Low elasticities (base elasticity values 
reduced by 50%)
High elasticities (base elasticity values 
increased by 50%)